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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ant to CPLR 302(a)(1),2 9 the court ordered a traverse hearing to deter-
mine if the defendant himself had any requisite contacts with the state.
Perlman, in accord with prior decisional law,30 recognizes that a
lawyer must rely on his client's activities within the state rather than
his own activity to perfect jurisdiction in an action against a non-
domiciliary client.
GPLR 302(a)(1): Jurisdiction predicated on combination of elements
individually insufficient to support jurisdiction.
In Margaret Watherston, Inc. v. Forman,31 the Civil Court, New
York County, decided whether the nonresident defendants' activities
constituted the transaction of business in New York. The defendants
contacted the plaintiff by mail and telephone from Chicago, and then
shipped a painting to the plaintiff in New York for restoration. After
the work was done in New York and the painting was returned, the
defendants refused to pay, claiming unsatisfactory performance.
Acknowledging that jurisdiction could not be predicated on a tele-
phone or mail order from outside New York,32 on the performance of
services here,33 or on the shipment of goods into New York, 4 the court
held that the combination of these elements was a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction "where defendants import into New York the res of the
29 Id., citing Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Lasker-Goldman Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 280, 258 N.E.2d
202, 809 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 342,
347 (1970).
30 See Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968);
McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 615, 617 (1968); Standard
Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 20 N.Y.2d 13, 228 N.E.2d 367, 281 N.Y.S.2d 299
(1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 436, 447 (1968).
8170 Misc. 2d 539, 334 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
32 Id. at 540, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 36, citing M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G.
Correale 8: Sons, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d 864, 285 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967); Electronic
Devices, Inc. v. Mark Rogers Assocs., 63 Misc. 2d 243, 311 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. T. 2d Dep't
1970) (per curiam).
33 70 Misc. 2d at 540, 34 N.Y.S.2d at 36. The court distinguished cases which pre-
dicated jurisdiction on the performance of services in New York, reasoning that the New
Yorker was the nonresident defendant's agent. Collateral Factors Corp. v. Meyers, 39 App.
Div. 2d 27, 330 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Ist Dep't 1972) (per curiam); John De Nigris Assocs., Inc. v.
Pacific Air Transp. Int'l, Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 363, 329 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1st Dep't 1972);
Elman v. Belson, 32 App. Div. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1969), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JonN's L. REv. 532,540 (1970).
34 70 Misc. 2d at 540, 834 N.Y.S.2d at 36, citing Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v.
Bombay Spirits Co., 20 N.Y.2d 13, 228 N.E.2d 367, 281 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1967), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 436, 447 (1968); Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d
27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST.
JoHN's L. R-v. 279, 292 (1966). The court distinguished these cases where the shipment
of goods into New York was the "essence or end of the contract" from the instant case
where the shipment of the painting into New York was "simply the means to or beginning
of the contract."
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contract upon which services are to be rendered here pursuant to defen-
dants' order telephoned or mailed from out of State."8 5 The court con-
cluded that where "[d]efendants have deliberately opted to take
advantage of the facilities available here... ,31 it is not unreasonable
that they be held subject to New York jurisdiction.8 7
CPLR 302(a)(1): "Bootstrap" jurisdiction not permitted in enforce-
ment of foreign divorce decrees.
Where jurisdiction is predicated on CPLR 302(a)(1), the cause of
action must arise directly from the transaction of business in New
York.88 In Kochenthal v. Kochenthal,89 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, determined that the execution of a separation agreement
in New York by New York domiciliaries, "sounds in contract" and
therefore constitutes a transaction of business under CPLR 302(a)(1).
Subsequently, in Lawrenz v. Lawrenz,40 the Westchester County Family
Court held that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomi-
ciliary defendant to enforce the support provisions of a bilateral Mexi-
can divorce decree, since those provisions were incorporated into the
decree from a New York-executed separation agreement. 41
In Carmichael v. Carmichael,42 the Second Department was pre-
sented recently with the same facts as in Lawrenz. The plaintiff sought
85 70 Misc. 2d at 541, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
36 Id., 334 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
87Accord, Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 18, 256 N.E.2d
506, 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1970); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 451-52, 209 N.E.2d 68, 71-72, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13-15, cert.
denied, 382 US. 905 (1965), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN'S L REv.
122, 133 (1965).
38 It is uniformly held that the cause of action must arise directly from the in-state
transaction. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 63-65 (1972) and cases therein
cited; 1 WK&M 302.06a; H. WAci-rryE., NEw YoRK PRAcrcE UNDR THE CPLR 32-34
(3d ed. 1970).
89 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282 N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d Dep't 1967). Accord, Zindwer v. Ehrens,
34 App. Div. 2d 906, 311 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Ist Dep't 1970) (mem.). But see Willis v. Willis,
42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (transaction of business
connotes a commercial agreement; separation agreement not encompassed by CPLR
302(a)(1)). The Willis analysis, specifically disapproved in Kochenthal, is easily refuted,
since commercial considerations can be the foundation of a separation agreement. "Ex-
tensive provisions are normally made for the division of property, complicated tax
structures are often erected, and in many cases escrow funds are created, with banks
acing as escrowees." 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 83 (1972). See also I
WK&M I 302.06a n.52a.
40 65 Misc. 2d 627, 318 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Fam. Ct. Westchester County 1971).
41 Id. at 631, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 615. The court noted that both litigants were New York
domiciliaries when the agreement was made, determined that CPLR 302 could properly
be used in family court proceedings, and decided that although the cause of action was
seemingly based on the terms of the decree, it in fact arose out of the separation agree-
ment. The complaint was dismissed, however, for defective service of process upon the
defendant.
4240 App. Div. 2d 514, 333 N.Y.S.2d 811 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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